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INTRODUCTION 
n 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act (less commonly referred 
to as the Trademark Act) in order to create substantive rights for 
trademark owners upon obtaining federal registration of their marks.1 
According to the 1946 Congressional Committee Reports, one of the 
general purposes of the Lanham Act is “to simplify trade-mark practice, 
to secure trade-mark owners in the good will which they have built up, 
and to protect the public from imposition by the use of counterfeit and 
imitated marks . . . .”2 In addition to protecting the consumer from 
counterfeit goods, a trademark owner is also protected from the 
unauthorized use of their mark by another.3 If, however, despite these 
protections, any person reproduces a registered mark without the 
consent of the mark owner, then the mark owner is entitled to a 
recovery of, among other things, the infringing defendant’s profits.4 
Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act covers a plaintiff’s right to 
monetary relief. Section 1117(a) states that if there is “a violation of 
any right of the registrant of a mark . . . under section 1125(a) or (d) of 
this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, . . . 
the plaintiff shall be entitled, . . . subject to the principles of equity, to 
recover . . . defendant’s profits . . . .”5 However, there has been a 
dispute “between the text of the Lanham Act and how courts interpret 
the Lanham Act.”6  
Since its inception in 1946, the Lanham Act has been subject to 
numerous statutory amendments, and § 1117(a) is no exception.7 In 
1999, Congress added the phrase “willful violation” to § 1117(a) in 
reference to § 1125(c) (the section of the Lanham Act covering 
dilution). Following this amendment, courts’ interpretations of 
1 Daphne Robert, Commentary on the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 
373, 375 (1996). 
2 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 5 (1946). 
3 See generally Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (stating that a person who uses or 
reproduces another’s mark “without the consent of the registrant . . . shall be liable in a civil 
action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.”). 
4 Id. § 1117(a). 
5 Id. (emphasis added). 
6 David S. Almeling, The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model: A Better Way to Award 
Monetary Relief in Trademark Cases, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 207 (2007) (emphasis 
added). 
7 Nicolle Zavadoff, Trademark Infringement and the Lanham Act: The Time for 
“Willfulness” to Be Uniformly Defined and Applied Under the Lanham Act Is Now, 
52 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71, 71 (2018). 
I 
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§ 1117(a) have been continually litigated.8 The discord between the
circuit courts was further complicated by disagreement as to whether
or not the “willful violation” language applied only to dilution actions
under § 1125(c) or if it applied to false designation of origin actions
under § 1125(a) as well, and what effect, if any, this language had on
the “principles of equity.”9
Since the addition of the phrase “willful violation,” the question of 
how to properly apply an infringing defendant’s intent when disgorging 
his profits yielded increased confusion and a subsequent split among 
the circuit courts.10 Despite the twenty years of litigation surrounding 
the meaning of this language, courts were unable to create a uniform 
approach to this issue. However, the United States Supreme Court 
finally resolved this schism with the Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, 
Inc. decision.11 
Part I of this Note traces the history and purpose of the Lanham Act. 
Part II discusses the split among circuit courts, both before and after 
the addition of the 1999 amendment, regarding the willfulness 
requirement. Part III discusses Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 
the case’s history, as well as the parties’ arguments before the Supreme 
Court. Part IV discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decision to decline 
to adopt a bright-line rule requiring a finding of willfulness before 
awarding a defendant’s profits, and instead to adopt a factor-based 
approach, whereby willfulness is one of several important factors to 
consider. Finally, Part V unpacks the policy implications that resulted 
from the Supreme Court’s decision to adopt a factor-based approach 
and how such a decision ultimately serves the broader purposes of the 
Lanham Act. 
8 Id. at 71–72. 
9 See Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The Michigan 
Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 609 (1997) (“In a broad jurisprudential sense, 
equity means the power to do justice in a particular case by exercising discretion to mitigate 
the rigidity of strict legal rules.” (emphasis added)). 
10 Timothy D. Kroninger, Awarding Profits in Trademark Infringement Actions: 
Reconciling the Circuit Split on the Willfulness Requirement with Underlying Trademark 
Law Rationales, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 793, 796 (2018). 
11 See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1492 (2020). 
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I 
HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE LANHAM ACT 
United States trademark law was born out of the English law of 
unfair competition.12 Trademarks were first conceptualized as property 
in the mid-nineteenth century, and British courts of equity would grant 
injunctive relief for trademark owners, even without a showing of an 
infringer’s intent to deceive.13 Trademark law was initially created for 
the purpose of preventing trade diversion by bad-faith competitors, 
ensuring “that no person has the right to pass off his goods as those of 
another.”14 Historically, liability for trademark infringement was 
meant to remedy the unjust enrichment that resulted from the 
infringer’s use of another’s mark and was seen as a method of 
upholding commercial morality and fairness.15 Early trademark 
protection acted as a “police measure” to protect the public against 
deceit through the sale of defective goods.16 Not until 1870 did 
Congress enact the first federal trademark statute, the Act of 1870.17  
The Act of 1870 established an exclusive use right for owners of 
federally registered marks, as well as a civil cause of action against 
those who wrongfully infringed upon the exclusive use rights of the 
trademark owner.18 However, as the Supreme Court noted in the 
Trade-Mark Cases of 1879, “The whole system of trade-mark property 
and the civil remedies for its protection existed long anterior to [the Act 
of 1870], and have remained in full force since its passage.”19 The Act 
of 1870 was grounded in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United 
States Constitution.20 However, the Supreme Court held the Act 
unconstitutional, finding that no trademark protection existed under 
this constitutional provision.21 
Following the Trade-Mark Cases, Congress enacted a second 
trademark statute in 1881, but the act was limited only to marks used 
12 Bartholomew Diggins, The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 35 GEO. L.J. 147, 148 (1947). 
13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9(d) (AM. L. INST. 1995). 
14 BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN-SOURCE CASEBOOK 16 (6th ed. 2019). 
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9(c) (AM. L. INST. 1995).  
16 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 60 TRADEMARK 
REP. 334, 338 (1970). 
17 Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retrospective of 
Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 60–61 (1996). 
18 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 85 (1879). 
19 Id. at 92. 
20 Id. at 85. This clause is now referred to as the “Patent and Copyright Clause.” 
21 See id. at 97–98. 
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in commerce with Native American tribes and foreign nations.22 
Congress then enacted the first modern federal trademark statute in 
1905, the Trademark Act of 1905.23 Unlike its 1870 predecessor, the 
1905 Act was grounded in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 
rather than the Patent and Copyright Clause.24 The 1905 Act “limited 
registration to fanciful and arbitrary marks, except for marks that had 
been in actual use for 10 years preceding passage of the statute.”25 The 
limitations of the 1905 Act precipitated further legislative activity. 
Congress sought to further strengthen the rights of trademark owners, 
culminating in the passage of the Trademark Act of 1946, commonly 
known today as the Lanham Act.26 
One important feature of the Lanham Act is that it creates a national 
system of trademark registration and protection.27 Upon registration, 
the owner of a federally registered mark may enforce its trademark 
rights against an infringer using a similar mark in a way that would 
likely cause consumer confusion.28 The marks protected include both 
trademarks for goods and service marks for services.29 Furthermore, 
with the addition of the Dilution Act in 1996, the Lanham Act also 
protects the owner of a federally registered “famous” mark against the 
use of a similar mark that would likely cause the owner’s mark to 
become “diluted.”30 At the time of its creation, one foundational 
“purpose of the Lanham Act was to . . . unify the common law of unfair 
competition and trademark protection” and to allow owners of federally 
registered marks to receive monetary relief from courts of law and 
injunctive relief from courts of equity.31  
Under § 1125 of the Lanham Act, the owner of a federally registered 
mark must satisfy a two-step process in order to be awarded monetary 





27 Lanham Act, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex 
/lanham_act [https://perma.cc/78MH-GSYF]. 
28 Id. 
29 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1053. 
30 Id. § 1125(c). 
31 Zavadoff, supra note 7, at 77. The earliest renditions of the Lanham Act, including 
the Trademark Act of 1905, were developed before the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938, which effectively eliminated the separation between courts of law and 
courts of equity. Today, the federal courts assume the role of both. 
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damages or injunctive relief.32 First, the mark owner must prove that 
the defendant infringed on her exclusive right to use the mark.33 In 
order to find infringement, the owner of a registered mark must show 
that the defendant’s use of her mark would likely cause consumer 
confusion as to the source of the goods or services.34 Many circuits 
have developed their own multifactor tests to determine whether a 
defendant’s mark is infringing. These tests apply to many forms of 
trademark infringement, including infringement of federally registered 
marks and common law trademark infringement.35  
Second, the plaintiff must ensure that the relief they seek conforms 
to the “principles of equity.” Because neither monetary damages nor 
injunctive relief are automatic upon a showing of infringement, a 
plaintiff must not only satisfy the necessary “likelihood of confusion” 
test but must also conform to the long-standing “principles of equity.”36 
Only when a plaintiff can show that (a) the defendant’s use of a mark 
has caused a likelihood of confusion and (b) the relief they seek 
satisfies the principles of equity may they actually receive monetary or 
injunctive relief.37 
One of the forms of monetary relief afforded to a trademark owner 
is the disgorgement of the infringing defendant’s profits.38 The 
standards for recovery of a defendant’s profits are outlined in § 1117(a) 
of the Lanham Act, which summarizes monetary recovery for both 
infringement and dilution.39 Section 1117(a) states the following: 
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in 
the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) 
32 Almeling, supra note 6, at 209. 
33 Id. 
34 Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 2017). 
35 See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012). 
To establish trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove: 
(1) that it owns a valid mark; (2) that the defendant used the mark “in commerce”
and without plaintiff’s authorization; (3) that the defendant used the mark (or an
imitation of it) “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising” of goods or services; and (4) that the defendant’s use of the mark is
likely to confuse consumers.
Id. (quoting Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a)). 
36 See Almeling, supra note 6, at 209 (“In other words, the plaintiff must satisfy both the 
likelihood-of-confusion test and the principles of equity to qualify for monetary or injunctive 
relief.”). 
37 The availability of injunctive relief is beyond the scope of this note. See, e.g., Davidoff 
& Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001).  
38 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
39 Id. 
2020] Resolving the “Willfulness” Conundrum:  213 
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., a Case Note
or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this 
title, shall have been established in any civil action arising under this 
chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of 
sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of 
equity, to recover . . . defendant’s profits . . . .40 
Much of the debate regarding whether a plaintiff is entitled to a 
defendant’s profits is related to the intent of the defendant. Prior to 
1999, § 1117(a) did not include any “willfulness” language.41 In 1999, 
Congress amended § 1117(a), and the term “willful” was added to 
modify the word “violation,” seemingly adding a new “willfulness” 
requirement that plaintiffs had to satisfy before collecting a defendant’s 
profits.42  
The 1999 amendment was added in an attempt to clear a drafting 
error, whereby Congress failed to cross-reference the dilution 
provision, § 1125(c), to the monetary recovery provision, § 1117(a). 
But the amendment created confusion as to whether the willfulness 
requirement applied to non-dilution actions as well.43 As a result, the 
application of the term “willful” to cases involving a violation of 
§ 1125(a) proved challenging for courts.44 Following the
implementation of the 1999 amendment, the circuits were split as to
whether, under § 1117(a), willful infringement was a prerequisite to an
award of a defendant’s profits for a violation of § 1125(a).45
II 
CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE 1999 AMENDMENT 
With the addition of the word “willfulness” to § 1117(a), a circuit 
split emerged among the federal circuit courts as to whether willfulness 
applied to false designation of origin actions under § 1125(a).46 In 
other words, the issue that resulted in the circuit split was whether 
§ 1125(a) required that the trademark owner prove that the defendant
acted willfully or intentionally in order to obtain an award of an
infringer’s profits.47 As the circuits began to wrestle with this
40 Id. 
41 Kroninger, supra note 10, at 812. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 813. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. 
46 Id. 
47 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 30:62 (5th ed. 2020).
214 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99, 207 
conundrum, two camps ultimately arose: those who adopted a bright-
line rule requiring a showing of an infringer’s willful intent and those 
who considered willfulness as one of several factors to analyze when 
deciding whether or not to award the defendant’s profits in an 
infringement action.48 Prior to the 1999 amendment, circuit courts 
generally relied upon prior intracircuit precedent and stayed firmly 
entrenched in one camp or another.49 But following the addition of the 
1999 amendment, some courts began to reconsider the role of 
willfulness in § 1125(a) infringement actions. 
On one side of the split were circuits that required a finding of 
willfulness before they awarded a defendant’s profits. The 
determination of willfulness was (and still is) a fact-specific inquiry, 
whereby courts “[were] looking for [evidence of] some kind of willful 
infringing conduct,” including fraud, intent to benefit from the 
trademark holder’s goodwill, and a deliberate intent to deceive.50 Once 
there was a finding of willful conduct, a court had the ability to award 
an accounting of an infringing defendant’s profits.51 On the other side 
of the split, circuits held that an award of a defendant’s profits could be 
obtained without a showing of willfulness.52 However, willfulness was 
still considered an important factor “in weighing the equities before a 
decision [was] made [on] whether to make [an] award o[f] profits.”53 
In other words, willfulness was regarded as one of several factors to 
consider when awarding an accounting of a defendant’s profits.  
The remainder of this section will analyze each side of the circuit 
split, both before and after the addition of the 1999 amendment. Note, 
however, that the First Circuit had yet to decide on which side of the 
issue it fell before the resolution of the circuit split.54 
A. Bright-Line Circuits
Nearly half of the federal circuit courts held that courts “[have] to 
find that [the] infringement of [p]laintiff[’s] trademark was willful.”55 
48 Kroninger, supra note 10, at 813.  
49 Id. 
50 MCCARTHY, supra note 47. 
51 Kroninger, supra note 10, at 813. 
52 Id. 
53  MCCARTHY, supra note 47. 
54 See Tamko Roofing Prods. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that products that are not in direct competition with each other need not be 
assessed for willfulness as a prerequisite for an accounting). 
55 4 Pillar Dynasty LLC v. N.Y. & Co., 933 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2019). 
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This included the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits.56 These 
circuits decided that the better reading of § 1117(a) required the 
adoption of a bright-line rule, a rule that required a finding of willful 
infringement before a court would award a defendant’s profits in an 
infringement action. What follows is a deeper analysis of the reasoning 
used by those circuits that required a finding of willfulness.  
Some scholars have deemed the Second Circuit as having 
spearheaded the move toward adopting the bright-line rule.57 The 
court in George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc. articulated this principle 
when it overturned a district court ruling holding that willfulness was 
not a necessary prerequisite to an accounting of a defendant’s profits.58 
The court stated that a finding of willfulness was required in order “to 
avoid the draconian impact that a profits remedy might have” absent 
such a finding.59 The court was concerned that without a showing of 
willful deceit, an award of an infringer’s profits may overcompensate 
for the plaintiff’s actual injury, creating a “windfall judgment at 
the defendant’s expense.”60 Following the addition of the 1999 
amendment, this remained the rule in the Second Circuit.61 
Prior to the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act, the Ninth Circuit 
was “[t]he lone circuit that waivered in its viewpoint and switched” 
from using the factor-based approach to adopting a bright-line 
approach.62 This circuit expressed its initial preference for the factor-
based approach in 1979 in Faberge, Inc. v. Saxony Products, Inc.63 
“Willful infringement,” the court explained, “may support an award of 
profits to the plaintiff, but [it] does not require [such an outcome].”64 
Thus, under the approach espoused by the Faberge court, willfulness 
was one of several factors to consider in a case of profit disgorgement. 
56 See, e.g., George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Faberge, Inc. v. Saxony Prods., Inc., 605 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1979); Bishop v. Equinox 
Int’l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 
F.3d 782, 791 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
57 Kroninger, supra note 10, at 814 (citing Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying
Trademark Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an Accounting of Defendant’s 
Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863, 889–90 (2002)). 
58 968 F.2d at 1537. 
59 Id. at 1540. 
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., 4 Pillar Dynasty LLC v. N.Y. & Co., 933 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2019). 
62 Kroninger, supra note 10, at 816. 
63 605 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1979). 
64 Id. 
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However, the Ninth Circuit adopted a bright-line approach fourteen 
years later in Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp.65 In this case, the court 
stated that the intent of the infringer should be considered dispositive 
when considering the issue of profit disgorgement.66 This remained the 
rule in the Ninth Circuit, as other cases in this circuit read Lindy Pen 
Co. to require a showing of willfulness in order for a plaintiff to be 
granted an award of the defendant’s profits.67 Courts in this circuit read 
the 1999 amendment as merely correcting a drafting error as it pertains 
to a dilution action under § 1125(c), and as such, a finding of 
willfulness remained a necessary requirement in order for a plaintiff to 
be awarded a defendant’s profits.68  
The Tenth Circuit also fell into the camp that required a finding of 
willful infringement before a court could disgorge a defendant’s 
profits.69 In Bishop v. Equinox Int’l Corp., the court held that “an award 
of profits may be proper . . . as a deterrent to willful infringement” and 
that such an award “require[d] a showing that defendant’s actions were 
willful or in bad faith.”70 Like many of its sister circuits, the Tenth 
Circuit “requir[ed] a showing of willfulness before profits [were] 
awarded [a]s an appropriate limitation in light of the equitable 
considerations underlying the monetary recovery provisions of the 
Lanham Act.”71  
Following the adoption of the 1999 amendment, the Tenth Circuit 
continued to require a finding of willful infringement. For instance, in 
Western Diversified Services, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., the 
court stated that “when a party seeks a profit award . . . we require a 
showing that [the d]efendant’s actions were willful to support an award 
of profits.”72 The court reasoned that such a finding was required to 
support the principles of equity and in order to avoid the possible 
windfall to the plaintiff.73 This bright-line approach remained the law 
65 982 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) (“This standard applies, however, only in those 
cases where the infringement is ‘willfully calculated to exploit the advantage of an 
established mark.’” (quoting Playboy Enters. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1274 
(9th Cir. 1982))). 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 441–42 (9th 
Cir. 2017). 
68 Id. 
69 Bishop v. Equinox Int’l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 427 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2005). 
73 Id. at 1272. 
2020] Resolving the “Willfulness” Conundrum:  217 
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., a Case Note
in the Tenth Circuit prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Romag 
Fasteners.74 
The last of the circuit courts that required a finding of willfulness 
was the Federal Circuit. In Romag Fasteners, the court stated that “[it 
saw] nothing in the 1999 amendment that allow[ed] [it] to depart from 
Second Circuit precedent requiring willfulness for the recovery of 
profits in infringement cases.”75 Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the 
Federal Circuit felt that the only purpose of the 1999 amendment was 
to clear up a drafting error pertaining to the dilution cause of action.76 
As such, willfulness was a requisite finding before a plaintiff could 
recover a defendant’s profits in the Federal Circuit.77 
B. Factor-Based Circuits
Instead of adopting a bright-line rule, many circuits chose to adopt a 
factor-based approach, whereby willfulness was just one of several 
factors to consider when awarding a defendant’s profits in an 
infringement action under § 1125(a).78 Among those following this 
approach were the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. 
The Third Circuit was one of the last circuits to weigh in on the issue 
of willfulness prior to the 1999 amendment.79 Prior to the 1999 
amendment, the Third Circuit found itself firmly entrenched in the 
camp opting for the adoption of a bright-line rule.80 However, the Third 
Circuit changed its position when it decided Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. 
Renosky. Instead of upholding the bright-line rule approach as adopted 
in SecuraComm, the court in Banjo Buddies stated that such an 
approach was statutorily superseded with the adoption of the 1999 
amendment.81 The court adopted the factor-based approach expressed 
by the Fifth Circuit in Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd.:  
74 See, e.g., Klein-Becker USA, LLC v. Englert, 711 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2013). 
75 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 F.3d 782, 791 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
76 Kroninger, supra note 10, at 824. 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating 
that willful infringement is not a prerequisite to a recovery of an infringer’s profits). 
79 Kroninger, supra note 10, at 815. 
80 See SecuraComm Consulting Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) 
(holding that a plaintiff must prove that an infringer acted willfully before an infringing 
defendant’s profits are recoverable).  
81 Banjo Buddies, 399 F.3d at 174. 
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These factors “include, but are not limited to (1) whether the 
defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2) whether sales 
have been diverted, (3) the adequacy of other remedies, (4) any 
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5) the 
public interest in making the misconduct unprofitable, and 
(6) whether it is a case of palming off.”82
Thus, in the Third Circuit, the infringer’s intent remained a critical 
aspect of the analysis regarding disgorgement of an infringer’s profits, 
but intent alone was no longer dispositive.83 
The Fourth Circuit held firm in its position that the defendant’s 
intent remained an important, but not dispositive, factor when awarding 
a defendant’s profits.84 Prior to the 1999 amendment, the Fourth 
Circuit held that a factor-based approach was better suited for 
considering whether a plaintiff is entitled to a profits award.85 
Following the adoption of the 1999 amendment, the Fourth Circuit 
continued to follow a factor-based approach. In the case of Synergistic 
Int’l LLC v. Korman, the court declined to adopt a bright-line rule that 
requires a finding of willfulness when assessing whether or not to 
award an accounting of profits.86 The court stated that “although 
willfulness is a proper and important factor in an assessment of whether 
to make a damages award, it is not an essential predicate thereto.”87
The Fifth Circuit used a factor-based approach in trademark 
infringement actions as early as 1980, but it was not until Pebble Beach 
in 1998 that a court in the Fifth Circuit applied this approach to a case 
involving a defendant’s potential willful infringement.88 In Pebble 
Beach, the court’s determination of whether an award of the 
defendant’s profits was appropriate was guided by a variety of 
“relevant factors,” including “whether the defendant had the intent to 
confuse or deceive” the consumer.89 Additionally, the court made sure 
to note that it “ha[d] not required a particular factor to be present” when 
making such a determination.90 Thus, Pebble Beach entrenched the 
82 Id. at 175; see also Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
83 Banjo Buddies, 399 F.3d at 175. 
84 See Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); see also 
Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 2006). 
85 Pizzeria Uno Corp., 747 F.2d at 1527. 
86 Synergistic Int’l, LLC, 470 F.3d at 175. 
87 Id. 
88 Kroninger, supra note 10, at 818–19. 
89 Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 1998). 
90 Id. 
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Fifth Circuit firmly with its sister circuits that regarded willfulness as 
only one factor to consider when determining an accounting of a 
defendant’s profits. Following Pebble Beach and the subsequent 
addition of the 1999 amendment, the Fifth Circuit continued to use a 
factor-based analysis when determining whether an accounting of a 
defendant’s profits was appropriate.91 
The Sixth Circuit also adopted a factor-based approach when 
assessing whether or not to disgorge a defendant’s profits. Both prior 
to the 1999 amendment as well as after, several courts in the Sixth 
Circuit held that “a showing of willful infringement [was] not required 
for . . . an award of profits.”92 In the 1991 case of Wynn Oil Co. v. 
American Way Service Corp., the court made it clear that a finding of 
willfulness was not required in order to award an accounting of a 
defendant’s profits.93 Specifically, the court stated that “there is no 
express requirement that . . . the infringer willfully infringe . . . to 
justify an award of profits.”94 The Sixth Circuit continued to follow 
such reasoning after the addition of the 1999 amendment.95
The Seventh Circuit was yet another circuit that regarded willfulness 
as one of many factors to consider when deciding whether a plaintiff 
was entitled to an award of the defendant’s profits. In 1989, the 
court in Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co. held that a defendant is not 
required to have willfully infringed a plaintiff’s mark to justify an 
accounting of profits.96 Instead, profits were awarded using several 
“different rationales including unjust enrichment, deterrence, and 
compensation.”97 
Although several trademark infringement cases had been decided in 
the Seventh Circuit prior to the addition of the 1999 amendment,98
there had not been any case that discussed willful infringement under 
§ 1117(a) following its adoption. Because the Seventh Circuit adopted
91 See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 919 F.3d 869, 876 (5th 
Cir. 2019); Quick Techs. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2002). 
92 Laukus v. Rio Brands, Inc., 391 F. App’x 416, 424 (6th Cir. 2010); see Wynn Oil Co. 
v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 607 (6th Cir. 1991).
93 943 F.2d at 607.
94 Id. (quoting Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989)).
95 See Laukus, 391 F. App’x at 424 (“Although showing willfulness is not required,
willfulness is one element that courts may consider in weighing” whether “an award of 
profits [is] warranted . . . .”). 
96  886 F.2d at 941. 
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g., Roulo, 886 F.2d at 941. 
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the factor-based approach prior to the 1999 amendment, the factor-
based approach withstood in the Seventh Circuit after the amendment. 
Thus, willfulness remained one factor out of many that the Seventh 
Circuit considered in the overall determination of whether an award of 
profits was appropriate.99 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit found itself entrenched in the camp 
following the factor-based approach when it considered an accounting 
of a defendant’s profits. Prior to the addition of the 1999 amendment, 
the Eleventh Circuit in Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Florida, 
Inc. stated that “a registrant whose rights are violated may generally 
recover the defendant’s profits from the infringing activity,” but that “a 
showing of intent or bad faith is unnecessary . . . to seek remedies 
pursuant to § 1117(a).”100 Following the adoption of the “willful 
infringement” language, the Eleventh Circuit maintained its position 
that a showing of willfulness was not required. 
In Axiom Worldwide, Inc. v. Excite Medical Corp., the court stated 
that “an award of profits [was] not ‘dependent upon a higher showing 
of culpability on the part of defendant, who is purposely using the 
trademark.’”101 The court went further, stating that district courts had 
the power to exercise broad discretion to dictate the quantum of 
relief.102 The court summed up its position by stating that “the law in 
this Circuit does not require a showing of willfulness before awarding 
profits as actual damages under the Lanham Act.”103 
As evidenced by this discussion, circuit courts were unable to find 
coherence in configuring a solution to the willfulness conundrum. 
However, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Romag Fasteners, Inc. 
v. Fossil, Inc., a solution to the decades-long question of whether
a plaintiff “must prove that the defendant acted willfully in order 
to receive an award of the defendant’s profits” has finally been 
reached.104
99 Kroninger, supra note 10, at 818. 
100 931 F.2d 1472, 1475–76 (11th Cir. 1991).  
101 591 F. App’x 767, 776 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 
F.2d 779, 782–83 (11th Cir. 1988)).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Ronald Mann, Argument Preview: Justices to Consider “Willfulness” Requirement
for Disgorgement of Profits of Trademark Infringer, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 7th, 2020, 
4:37 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/01/argument-preview-justices-to-consider 
-willfulness-requirement-for-disgorgement-of-profits-of-trademark-infringer/
[https://perma.cc/Z9Q7-KSER].
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III 
ROMAG FASTENERS, INC. V. FOSSIL, INC.: CASE HISTORY 
A. Background Facts
Petitioner Romag Fasteners, Inc. (“Romag”), is a Connecticut-based 
corporation that manufactures magnetic snap fasteners.105 
Manufactured in China by Wing Yip Metal Manufactory Accessories 
(“Wing Yip”), these snaps are sold under its registered trademark 
“ROMAG.”106 In 2002, Romag entered into an agreement with Fossil, 
Inc. (“Fossil”), for the use of ROMAG fasteners in Fossil handbags.107 
Fossil is a Delaware corporation that “designs, markets, and distributes 
fashion accessories, including jewelry, handbags, and small leather 
goods . . . .”108 As a regular part of its business, Fossil contracts with 
independent businesses to manufacture its products.109 Superior 
Leather Limited (“Superior”), a Chinese company, was one of those 
businesses that contracted with Fossil; Superior bought component 
parts for, and manufactured, Fossil’s handbags.110 
From 2002 to 2008, “Superior purchased tens of thousands of 
ROMAG snaps from Wing Yip for use in Fossil products.”111 But from 
August 2008 and the time of the initial lawsuit, “Superior purchased 
only a few thousand ROMAG snaps from Wing Yip.”112 Shortly 
thereafter, in 2010, Mr. Reiter, the founder and president of Romag, 
was made aware of possible counterfeit ROMAG snaps in Fossil’s 
goods.  
The year 2010 was not the first time that Mr. Reiter discovered 
counterfeit ROMAG snaps being used in Fossil handbags. In 
November 2007, Mr. Reiter discovered Fossil handbags containing 
counterfeit ROMAG snaps during a routine shopping trip at a nearby 
J.C. Penny.113 Two years later, in November 2009, Mr. Reiter again
discovered counterfeit ROMAG snaps in Fossil handbags sold at DSW,
105 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 91 (D. Conn. 2014). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 92; see also Brief for the Petitioner at 11, Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 
140 S. Ct. 1492 (2020) (No. 18-1233). 
108 Romag, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 92. 
109 Brief for Respondents at 3, Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492 
(2020) (No. 18-1233). 
110 Id. 
111 Romag, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 92. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
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Inc. (“DSW”).114 According to the district court, “Romag never 
informed Fossil about either [instance of discovering counterfeit 
ROMAG snaps on items at J.C. Penney or DSW], nor warned Fossil 
about the presence of counterfeit ROMAG snaps in the United States 
market.”115 On May 12, 2010, Mr. Reiter received an anonymous email 
from a former employee of Wing Yip who stated that a “factory in 
China had been producing magnetic snap fasteners bearing the 
ROMAG mark without authorization.”116 In November 2010, shortly 
after receiving the email, Mr. Reiter confirmed that Superior (Fossil’s 
Chinese manufacturing partner) had manufactured bags containing 
counterfeit ROMAG snaps.117 Romag then brought the current action 
against Fossil. 
B. District Court Decision on the “Willfulness” Issue
On November 22, 2010, Romag brought suit against Fossil in the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut for patent 
infringement, state common law unfair competition, violation of the 
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), false designation of 
origin, and trademark infringement.118 After a seven-day trial, on April 
3, 2014, a jury awarded Romag “$90,759.36 of Fossil’s profits for 
trademark infringement under an unjust enrichment theory and 
$6,704,046.00 of Fossil’s profits for trademark infringement under a 
deterrence theory,” determining that “one percent of Fossil’s profits 
were attributable to its infringement of the ROMAG mark.”119  
During the trial, Fossil argued that Romag was not entitled to any 
award of profits absent a finding of willful infringement.120 Romag, on 
the other hand, argued that “the 1999 amendments to the Lanham Act 
effectively abrogated Second Circuit precedent requiring willfulness 
for an award of profits.”121 Ultimately, the district court stated: 
Contrary to Romag’s arguments, the plain language of § 1117(a) 
does not indicate that Congress intended to abrogate the common-
law willfulness requirement by adding the word “willful” to modify 
114 Id. at 93. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 94. 
118 Id. at 85, 95. 
119 Id. at 90; see also Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 F.3d 782, 783–84 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). 
120 Romag, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 107. 
121 Id.  
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the trademark dilution section of the statute. . . . The post-amendment 
language with respect to section 1125(a) is the same language that 
the Second Circuit interpreted, based on the principles of equity, to 
require a finding of willfulness before disgorgement of profits could 
be awarded.122 
With this holding, the district court concluded that “willfulness is 
required for an award of profits,” and “in light of the absence of 
evidence in the language of the statute . . . of a clear congressional 
intent to abrogate the existing Second Circuit precedent,” the 
willfulness requirement remains a prerequisite to an award of the 
infringing party’s profits.123 Thus, the district court held that Romag 
was not entitled to an award of Fossil’s profits.124 
C. Federal Circuit Decision on the “Willfulness” Issue
After the district court’s decision, Romag appealed to the Federal 
Circuit,125 contending “that the district court erred in holding that a 
trademark owner must prove that the infringer acted willfully to 
recover the infringing defendant’s profits.”126 Noting that the Supreme 
Court had yet to address whether proof of willful conduct is required 
before a plaintiff can recover an award of the defendant’s profits, the 
Federal Circuit took a survey of every circuit court that had decided on 
the willfulness issue.127  
After an extensive analysis of the current circuit split regarding the 
willfulness requirement, the Federal Circuit decided to follow Second 
Circuit precedent that required a finding of willfulness as a prerequisite 
to a disgorgement of a defendant’s profits.128 Specifically, the court 
stated that there is “nothing in the 1999 amendment that permits [the 
court] to declare that . . . Second Circuit precedent is no longer good 
law.”129 
122 Id. at 109.  
123 Id. at 108, 111.  
124 Id. at 111. 
125 A patent infringement claim was brought on appeal along with the trademark 
infringement claim, giving the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over this case. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(1).
126 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 F.3d 782, 784 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
127 Id. at 785–89.
128 Id. at 789; see also Brief for Respondents, supra note 109, at 11 (stating that “[t]he
Federal Circuit agreed, seeing ‘no reason to relitigate’ the question [of the willfulness 
requirement in infringement cases].”). 
129 Romag, 817 F.3d at 789. 
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The court scrutinized the legislative history of the 1999 amendment 
in an attempt to properly construe whether willfulness was required for 
the recovery of profits in infringement cases.130 The court hinged its 
concluding analysis on three considerations: (1) that the purpose of the 
1999 amendment was to correct a drafting error in the 1996 Dilution 
Act, (2) that the language of the statute regarding infringement liability 
remained unchanged as to the award of profits under the “principles of 
equity,” and (3) the addition of the term “willfulness” to the statute as 
it pertains to dilution cases “does not create a negative pregnant that 
willfulness is always required in dilution cases but never for 
infringement [cases].”131 
Turning now to its first point of discussion, the court held that the 
1999 amendment did not indicate congressional intent to effect any 
change to the willfulness requirement for violations of § 1125(a), the 
false designation of origin section of the Lanham Act. Instead, the 
amendment added only a willfulness requirement to § 1125(c), the 
dilution section of the Lanham Act.132 Furthering its point, the court 
stated that “[g]iven the alleged significance of the purported change, 
one would have expected to see an acknowledgement or discussion 
from Congress of the courts of appeals cases in the relevant area if 
Congress had intended to resolve the circuit conflict.”133 In other 
words, the court held that if Congress intended to resolve the circuit 
split, it would have explicitly indicated such a change.134 In sum, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the 1999 amendment did not change 
Second Circuit precedent as it pertains to willfulness as a prerequisite 
to recovery under § 1125(a). 
Moving to its second consideration, the Federal Circuit reasoned that 
the circuit split was not resolved with the addition of the willfulness 
requirement.135 To the contrary, the court reasoned that “[b]y 
reenacting that standard, Congress could not have ratified a consistent 
judicial construction of § 1117(a) because there was a split in the courts 
of appeals . . . as to the willfulness requirement.”136 Instead of holding 
that the 1999 amendment resolved the circuit split in regard to the 
willfulness requirement, the Federal Circuit decided to follow the 
130 Id. at 789–91. 
131 Id. at 789–90. 
132 Id. at 789. 
133 Id. at 790. 
134 Id. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
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Second Circuit’s line of reasoning, namely that a finding of willful 
infringement is required before disgorging an infringing defendant’s 
profits under § 1125(a).137  
For its last consideration, the Federal Circuit held that “the inserted 
language concerning willfulness does not create a negative pregnant 
that willfulness is always required in dilution cases but never for 
infringement.”138 The court expressed its concern with Romag’s 
reliance on cases where a negative pregnant was inferred. Specifically, 
the court pointed to the fact that these cases involved statutory 
provisions that were enacted at the same time.139 In this case, however, 
the court “d[id] not think that Congressional intent can be inferred from 
an amendment passed years after the fact.”140  
In its concluding remarks, the court held that the “willful violation” 
language was added in order to distinguish dilution cases from 
infringement cases only in the area of damages.141 The court stated that 
“Congress wished to limit damages awards for dilution to cases 
involving willfulness,” and “even with respect to awards of profits in 
dilution cases, the addition of ‘willful violation’ was necessary to 
establish a uniform rule” in the infringement context as well.142 To put 
it simply, the court held that Romag was not entitled to recover an 
award of profits for a violation of § 1125(a) because they did not prove 
that Fossil willfully infringed their mark.143 
D. Supreme Court Briefs and Arguments
1. Brief for Romag
On March 22, 2019, Romag filed its petition for a writ of certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court. Romag’s petition focused on 
three main arguments: (1) the fact that the courts of appeals are 
inextricably divided as to whether willfulness is required in order to 
recover profits for trademark infringement presents the Court with the 
137 See id. at 789 (“Critically important for us, however, is the rule followed in the 
Second Circuit. . . . [W]e see nothing in the 1999 amendment that permits us to declare that 
the governing Second Circuit precedent is no longer good law.”). 




142 Id. at 790–91. 
143 Id. at 791.  
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opportunity to resolve this long-standing problem,144 (2) the question 
regarding whether willfulness is a prerequisite to a recovery of an 
infringing defendant’s profits has appeared on many occasions, thereby 
amplifying the importance of its resolution,145 and (3) the Federal 
Circuit’s decision that required a finding of willfulness is incorrect and 
undermines the plain text of the Lanham Act.146 After receiving 
Romag’s petition, the Court recognized that resolving this issue was 
necessary, and as such, granted certiorari.  
In its brief, Romag’s main argument reads as follows: “[W]illfulness 
is not required under section 1117(a) to award infringers’ profits for 
violations of section 1125(a).”147 Romag’s main argument rests on two 
main considerations: (1) that the language and structure of the Lanham 
Act compel the conclusion that willfulness is not a prerequisite to a 
recovery of a defendant’s profits under § 1117(a)148 and (2) that the 
phrase “principles of equity” does not necessitate the imposition of a 
willfulness requirement.149 The following paragraphs will explore each 
of these points further.  
Romag’s first point relied explicitly on the plain language of the 
Lanham Act, namely that § 1117(a) does not include any willfulness 
requirement for an award of profits under § 1125(a).150 Specifically, 
Romag pointed out that “[s]ection 1117(a) requires mark holders to 
establish ‘a violation under section 1125(a) or (d)’ as a prerequisite to 
recovering damages, profits, or costs,” but that “[t]he modifier ‘willful’ 
appears nowhere in that phrase.”151 As such, since the term 
“willfulness” does not appear in conjunction with § 1125(a), the Court 
should “refrain from reading [it] into the statute when Congress has left 
it out.”152 
Moreover, as Romag pointed out, Congress made a distinction 
between a violation of some provisions of the Lanham Act and a willful 
violation under others.153 With the addition of the 1999 amendment, 
Congress distinguished “a willful violation under section 1125(c)” 
144 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13, Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 
1492 (2020) (No. 18-1233). 
145 Id. at 18. 
146 Id. at 24. 
147 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 107, at 19. 
148 Id. at 20. 
149 Id. at 28.  
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from other provisions of the Lanham Act.154 The Supreme Court has 
historically presumed “that Congress ‘acts intentionally when it uses 
particular language in one section of the statute but omits it in 
another.’”155 With this in mind, Romag argued that Congress intended 
to “distinguish between ‘a violation,’ on the one hand, and a ‘willful 
violation,’ on the other.”156 Had Congress intended to create a 
universal willfulness requirement, it could have easily done so. 
Furthermore, Romag argued that the broader structure of the 
Lanham Act affirms a plain-language interpretation of § 1117(a).157 In 
particular, Romag argued that “[t]hroughout the Lanham Act, Congress 
specified when a culpable mental state was a prerequisite to liability or 
relief.”158 For instance, § 1117(c) states that a court may allow a mark 
holder to recover up to $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark if the infringer 
acted willfully.159 Section 1117(b) requires a court to award treble 
damages or profits in cases where “the violation consists of . . . 
intentionally using a mark . . . knowing such mark . . . is a counterfeit 
mark . . . .”160 Moreover, § 1125(d) provides that a person commits 
cyberpiracy if he “has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark.”161 
Romag concluded: “Had Congress intended the 1999 amendment to 
impose uniformity, it would have made little sense to leave the circuit 
split over profits awards for violations other than trademark dilution 
[under § 1125(c)] unresolved.”162 
Romag’s second point, that the phrase “principles of equity” does 
not necessitate a willfulness requirement, rested on three contentions: 
(1) the “essence of equity is flexibility, not rigidity,” (2) the Supreme
Court “has repeatedly rejected the notion that background legal
principles—including ‘principles of equity’—can smuggle in atextual
limitations that would override a statute’s plain text,” and (3) that under
common law, courts did not impose a uniform willfulness requirement
in order to recover a trademark infringer’s profits.163 The following
paragraphs explore these contentions further.
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 22 (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 U.S. 383, 391 (2015)). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 23.  
158 Id. 
159 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (emphasis added). 
160 Id. § 1117(b) (emphasis added). 
161 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).  
162 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 107, at 28. 
163 Id. at 29.  
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For its first contention, Romag argued that “[f]lexibility is ‘inherent 
in equitable remedies.’”164 Romag pointed out that just before the 
passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that “[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power . . . to 
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case,” and that 
“[f]lexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.”165 Given the 
flexible nature of equity, it makes little sense that Congress chose to 
include the phrase “principles of equity” to create a rigid, categorical 
willfulness requirement.166 
Next, Romag asserted that the Supreme Court has before refused to 
expand the meaning of the “principles of equity” to the point that the 
newly incorporated legal rules would override the statute’s plain 
text.167 Since § 1117(a) does not require plaintiffs to prove willfulness 
to recover profits under any cause of action other than trademark 
dilution under § 1125(c), Romag argued that the Court should not read 
“principles of equity” to impose a willfulness requirement for other 
provisions of the Lanham Act.168 Romag alleged that doing so would 
again override the plain text of the statute, and thus the Court should 
refuse to impose such a requirement.169  
Lastly, Romag contended that common law courts did not 
universally require a showing of willfulness to recover a defendant’s 
profits for trademark infringement.170 According to Romag, an 
accounting of an infringing defendant’s profits did not require a 
showing of intentional misconduct; willfulness, for example, was not 
dispositive of a profits award.171 Furthermore, courts of equity had 
broad discretion to consider the trademark infringer’s intent.172 In 
deciding whether to award profits, “no consensus existed [at common 
law] that willfulness was a prerequisite to awards.”173 Instead, 
“[c]ourts treated intent as part of a holistic analysis.”174 
164 Id. at 30 (quoting United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183–84 (1987)). 
165 Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30 
(1944)).  
166 Id.  
167 Id. at 33 (citing Park N’ Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985)). 
168 Id. at 34.  
169 See id. at 29. 
170 Id. at 35. 
171 Id. at 36–37.  
172 Id. at 39.  
173 Id. at 37.  
174 Id. at 39 (noting that the holistic “intent” analysis includes willfulness). 
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Taken together, Romag’s argument rested on two main contentions: 
(1) that the language and structure of the Lanham Act compel the
conclusion that willfulness is not a prerequisite to a recovery of a
defendant’s profits and (2) that the phrase “principles of equity” does
not necessitate the imposition of a willfulness requirement. These
arguments were meant to further Romag’s primary argument: that
willfulness was not required for an award of an infringing defendant’s
profits for violations of § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act.175
2. Brief for Fossil
In its brief, Fossil made three overarching arguments: (1) that the
text of § 1117(a) incorporates traditional limits on equitable relief,176 
(2) that traditional principles of equity require willfulness for an award
of a defendant’s profits,177 and (3) that Romag’s interpretation of
§ 1117(a) was bad policy.178 Taken together, these arguments support
Fossil’s main point: a finding of willfulness was required under
§ 1117(a) in order for a court to award an accounting of a defendant’s
profits.179
Fossil first argued that “[t]he text is plain that an award of profits 
‘will [not] be ordered merely because there has been an 
infringement.’”180 Additionally, Fossil argued that the phrase “subject 
to the principles of equity” necessarily signaled a limitation.181 
Furthermore, “the phrase ‘principles of equity’ refers to the established 
rules of equity jurisprudence.”182 Taken together, according to Fossil, 
this textual limitation confirmed that § 1117(a) of the Lanham Act 
necessarily codified the traditional willfulness requirement, as 
“willfulness was a well-established prerequisite to a profits award.”183 
Fossil pointed to a second canon of statutory construction: “Where 
statutory text has ‘already been construed,’ a court is ‘especially 
justified in presuming both that’ Congress was ‘aware of the prior 
175 Id. at 19.  
176 Brief for Respondents, supra note 109, at 15. 
177 Id. at 30. 
178 Id. at 49. 
179 Id. at 11–12. 
180 Id. at 16 (second alteration in original). 
181 Id. (emphasis added) (stating that the words “subject to” signal a limitation on the 
court’s analysis). 
182 Id. at 17. 
183 Id.  
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interpretation’ and that the ‘interpretation reflects their [sic] intent’ 
. . . .”184 Here, Fossil argued that Congress not only decided against 
disavowing the settled interpretation of § 1117(a) (which, according to 
Fossil, requires a finding of willfulness) but also added words of 
limitation.185 As such, “[t]he statutory text Congress enacted confirms 
that it meant to carry over limitations on monetary remedies embodied 
in traditional equitable principles. . . . [T]his explains why courts 
continued to require willfulness to award an infringer’s profits after the 
Lanham Act was enacted.”186 
Next, Fossil argued that nothing in § 1117(a) of the Lanham Act 
overrides the traditional requirement of willfulness.187 Under the 
Lanham Act, Fossil argued, an infringer’s profits are not automatically 
available as a remedy merely because there has been an 
infringement.188 Additionally, when Congress amended § 1117(a) in 
1999 to clear a drafting error pertaining to dilution cases, “[i]t included 
‘a willful violation under section 1125(c)’ in the list of violations that 
must be established at the first step of the Section 1117(a) analysis.”189 
Thus, Fossil argued that the addition of this language made it clear to 
readers that a finding of willfulness was a precondition to any relief 
under § 1117(a).190  
In contrast to Romag’s contention that requiring a finding of 
willfulness under § 1117(a) would create a tension with other 
provisions of the Lanham Act, Fossil found no such tension. Fossil 
argued that the listed provisions in Romag’s brief, such as §§ 1117(b) 
and 1125(d), “serve[] a clear purpose,” existing as “independent and 
free-standing provision[s] separate and apart from section 1117(a).”191 
Instead, Fossil argued that “it is Romag’s interpretation that creates a 
problem with the text” of the statute, as it failed to define “principles 
of equity,” all the while “offer[ing] no basis to import some of these 
principles but not others, such as the willfulness requirement for a 
profits award.”192 
184 Id. at 19. 
185 Id. 
186 Id.  
187 Id. at 22.  
188 Id. (citing Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947)). 
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Fossil then argued that traditional principles of equity required a 
showing of willfulness for a profits award.193 Fossil maintains that 
“[f]or well over a century, a clearly established principle of equity 
required willfulness before a court would compel an infringer to 
account for, and turn over, its profits.”194 Throughout the nineteenth 
century, courts were consistent about requiring some proof of willful 
or fraudulent intent.195 Following the passage of the 1905 Act, courts 
continued to apply the traditional willfulness rule, a rule that held true 
in both federal and state courts.196 Thus, Fossil argued that this history 
and “Romag’s insistence . . . that no traditional rule requiring 
willfulness existed” cannot coexist.197 Therefore, Fossil contended that 
Romag’s arguments “cannot support a conclusion that the rule 
requiring willfulness to order an accounting was unclear by 1946.”198 
Next, Fossil countered Romag’s argument that adding a willfulness 
requirement would be inconsistent with the “principles of equity.”199 
Recall that Romag contended that referring to the principles of equity 
necessarily implied “broad discretion to tailor an award of monetary 
relief.”200 Fossil, on the other hand, contended that “some ‘principles 
of equity’ that Section 1117(a) incorporates will involve the exercise 
of remedial discretion,” but “[d]iscretion is not whim, and limiting 
discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic 
principle of justice . . . .”201 Fossil stated that equity and bright-line 
rules are not mutually exclusive, and as such, the addition of a 
willfulness requirement was consistent with the principles of equity.202 
Lastly, Fossil argued that Romag’s interpretation is bad policy.203 
Fossil posited three main justifications for this argument. First, if a 
profits award were available without a willfulness requirement, then 
trademark owners could extort good-faith infringers.204 This, in turn, 
193 Id. at 30. 
194 Id.  
195 Id. at 32.  
196 Id. at 35–36.  
197 Id. at 38.  
198 Id. at 43.  
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200 Id. at 45 (quoting Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 107, at 30).  
201 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 
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would allow mark owners to consolidate market power through 
enforcement of their marks.205 Second, according to Fossil, Romag 
offered no reason to award an innocent infringer’s profits.206 Fossil 
argued that Romag did not have to have a reason; Congress already 
decided to address the willfulness issue, “and it chose not to broaden 
the availability of a profits award.”207 Finally, Fossil argued that other 
intellectual property statutes do not support Romag’s reading.208 Under 
both the Copyright Act and the Patent Act, recovery of an infringer’s 
profits are limited by equitable concerns, and as such, “[i]t is Romag’s 
interpretation that would render the Lanham Act an outlier among 
intellectual property statutes.”209 
Taken together, Fossil’s argument rested on three main propositions: 
(1) that the text of § 1117(a) incorporates traditional limits on equitable
relief, (2) that traditional principles of equity require willfulness for an
award of a defendant’s profits, and (3) that Romag’s interpretation was
bad policy. These propositions were meant to support Fossil’s main
argument: that the Supreme Court should require a finding of
willfulness under § 1117(a) of the Lanham Act before a recovery of an
infringing defendant’s profits is warranted.
3. Summary of Arguments
Romag and Fossil argued their respective cases before the Supreme
Court on January 14, 2020.210 As mentioned above, Romag argued that 
the Court should not require willfulness as a prerequisite to recovery of 
an infringing defendant’s profits. Both the plain language of the 
Lanham Act and the structure of the Lanham Act as a whole do not 
support the conclusion that willfulness is a necessary prerequisite to 
recovery of a defendant’s profits. Furthermore, Romag argued that the 
phrase “principles of equity” does not support the imposition of a 
“willfulness” requirement because this would create an unnecessary 
limitation on the traditional flexibility afforded to equitable relief. 
Fossil supported a different conclusion: that the Supreme Court 
should find that “willfulness” was a necessary prerequisite to recovery 
of an infringing defendant’s profits. Fossil argued that the text of 
§ 1117(a) incorporates traditional limits on equitable relief and that
205 Id. at 50. 
206 Id. at 51. 
207 Id. at 54. 
208 Id.  
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traditional principles of equity have always required a finding of 
willfulness prior to a recovery of profits. Furthermore, Fossil pointed 
to a variety of risks associated with the adoption of Romag’s position 
regarding the willfulness requirement, including its effect on good-
faith infringers and the threat of market consolidation by mark owners. 
IV 
SUPREME COURT DECISION 
On April 23, 2020, the Supreme Court handed down its decision, 
holding that a plaintiff in a trademark infringement action is not 
required to show that a defendant willfully infringed the plaintiff’s 
trademark as a prerequisite to an award of the infringing defendant’s 
profits.211 The Court based its decisions on several salient 
considerations: (1) the plain language of § 1117(a) of the Lanham Act 
has never required a showing of willfulness to award a defendant’s 
profits when a plaintiff proceeds under § 1125(a),212 (2) the absence of 
a mental state requirement in § 1117(a) is indicative of Congress’s 
intent to leave out such a standard, especially because mental states are 
expressly included in several other provisions of the Lanham Act,213 
(3) the phrase “principles of equity” does not direct the Court to a
narrow rule that requires a finding of willfulness in order for a plaintiff
to recover an infringing defendant’s profits,214 and (4) whether
trademark law has historically required a finding of willfulness before
allowing a profits remedy is unclear.215 The remainder of this section
will explore each of these considerations in further detail.
Turning to its first consideration, the Court stated that “the statute 
. . . make[s] a showing of willfulness a precondition to a profits award 
. . . under § 1125(c).”216 However, as the Court pointed out, Romag did 
not allege a violation under § 1125(c), but instead, alleged and proved 
a violation under § 1125(a).217 The Court further articulated this point 
by stating that actions arising under a violation of § 1125(a) “ha[ve] 
never required a showing of willfulness to win a defendant’s 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 1495. 
213 Id. at 1495–96. 
214 Id. at 1496. 
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profits.”218 The Court concluded its first contention by stating that 
“th[e] Court [does not] usually read into statutes words that aren’t 
there,” especially “when Congress has . . . included the term elsewhere 
in the very same statutory provision.”219 Thus, the Court refused to 
read a willfulness requirement into actions arising under § 1125(a). 
Next, the Court took “[a] wider look at the statute’s structure,” 
referring to various other sections of the Lanham Act where a mental 
state was explicitly included.220 The Court stated that “[t]he Lanham 
Act speaks often and expressly about mental states” in order to 
establish liability, including in §§ 1117(b), 1117(c), and 1125(c).221 
Additionally, the Court stated that “[w]ithout doubt, the Lanham Act 
exhibits considerable care with mens rea standards. The absence of any 
such standard in the provision before us, thus, seems all the more 
telling.”222 Such expressions of an explicit mental state in some 
statutory provisions, but not in § 1125(a), led the Court to agree with 
Romag’s contention that if Congress had intended to include a mental 
state requirement in connection to § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, they 
could have easily done so.223 
The Court moved next to its discussion of the phrase “principles of 
equity.”224 The Court began this discussion by questioning Fossil’s 
contention that “equity courts [have] historically required a showing of 
willfulness before authorizing a profits remedy in trademark 
disputes.”225 According to Fossil, in courts of equity, in trademark 
cases alone, “a willfulness requirement was so long and universally 
recognized that today it rises to the level of a ‘principle of equity’ the 
Lanham Act carries forward.”226 According to the Court, Fossil’s 
contention that the term “principles of equity” includes a willfulness 
requirement would require the Court to assume that Congress intended 
to incorporate a willfulness requirement into § 1125(a) “while it 
prescribed mens rea conditions expressly elsewhere throughout the 
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might be possible, “on first blush it isn’t exactly an obvious 
construction of the statute.”228  
Furthermore, the Court held that the phrase “principles of equity” 
does not “readily bring to mind a substantive rule about mens rea from 
a discrete domain like trademark law.”229 Instead, the phrase more 
aptly suggests fundamental rules that apply across practice areas rather 
than a set of principles and doctrines specific to trademark law.230 With 
this in mind, the Court concluded that it is “a little unlikely [that] 
Congress meant ‘principles of equity’ to direct [the Court] to a narrow 
rule about a profits remedy within trademark law.”231 
Lastly, the Court stated that whether trademark law has historically 
required a showing of willfulness on the part of an infringer before 
awarding a plaintiff an award of profits is unclear.232 The Court pointed 
to several cases in Fossil’s brief that support the assertion that some 
courts, both before and after the passage of the Trademark Act of 1905, 
treated willfulness as a prerequisite for an award of profits.233 
Alternatively, as the Court noted, Romag cited several other cases that 
expressly reject such a rule.234 Ultimately, the Court held that the 
infringer’s intent has historically been considered an important 
consideration when awarding a plaintiff an infringing defendant’s 
profits.235 This holding, however, “is a far cry from insisting on the 
inflexible precondition to recovery Fossil advances.”236 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court sided with Romag, holding that 
although willfulness is an important factor to consider when awarding 
profits under § 1117(a), it is not dispositive.237 The Court declined to 
adopt a bright-line approach because such an approach stands in 
contradiction to the plain language of the statute. A bright-line 
approach also misdirects the meaning of the phrase “principles of 
equity” to a narrow rule about a profits remedy within trademark 
law.238 The Court reversed and remanded the case for further 
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proceedings consistent with the new rule requiring a factor-based 
approach when making equitable considerations.239 
V 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Although the Supreme Court declined to base its decision on policy 
considerations,240 several important policy goals were nonetheless 
achieved with the Supreme Court’s decision to adopt a factor-based 
approach. First, trademark owners now have broader protection against 
infringement of their marks because there is no longer a “willfulness” 
roadblock on the path to monetary recovery in the form of an infringing 
defendant’s profits. Second, the adoption of a factor-based approach 
further deters defendants from infringement, as well as prevents 
defendants from acquiring unjust gains.241 Third, such deterrence 
protects the consuming public from purchasing infringing products. 
Finally, this approach allows courts to retain the flexibility traditionally 
accorded to them when making equitable considerations, particularly 
when ordering an accounting of a defendant’s profits in trademark 
infringement actions.242 
With the Court’s adoption of a factor-based approach, trademark 
owners now have broader protection against infringement of their 
marks. Securing adequate remedies to compensate for a plaintiff’s 
injury is an already difficult process,243 and in many cases, proof of 
actual damages can be highly speculative.244 As a result, “it is 
important that courts have the accounting remedy available to do 
justice, even in the absence of willful misconduct by a defendant.”245 
If the Supreme Court adopted a bright-line rule that required a finding 
of willfulness, recourse for a plaintiff would have been extremely 
difficult, and in turn, would “not adequately serve the policy of 
protecting trademark owners [against infringement].”246 But a factor-
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based approach gives courts the ability to award an accounting based 
on more than just a defendant’s intent, thus providing a plaintiff with 
broader protection against infringement. 
Because a factor-based approach provides plaintiffs with broader 
protection and easier access to remedies, this approach will further 
deter defendants from committing infringement, as well as prevent 
defendants from acquiring unjust gains. By declining to adopt the 
willfulness requirement, the Supreme Court effectively lifted the 
protective veil from infringing defendants. Without such a barrier to 
relief, defendants are likely to proceed with increased diligence when 
adopting their marks because such diligence will be necessary to avoid 
costly litigation. Furthermore, easier access to remedies for plaintiffs 
further serves the policy of guarding against unjust gains on the part of 
an infringing defendant. Easier access to remedies also ensures that a 
prevailing plaintiff has an available remedy to be made whole 
regardless of whether the defendant acted willfully.247 
By further deterring would-be defendants from infringing a 
plaintiff’s mark, not only are mark owners protected from injury caused 
by infringers but the consuming public is also protected against 
purchasing counterfeit goods.248 Additionally, the consuming public 
will have greater confidence that the product bearing a particular mark 
that it views with favor will, in fact, be the product they intended to 
purchase. Furthermore, such a policy outcome conforms with the 
policy goals of the Lanham Act as a whole.249 Thus, not only does the 
Supreme Court’s decision protect mark owners against the damages 
caused by infringement but it also serves to protect the consuming 
public as well. 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision advocates for a flexible and 
balanced interpretation of the phrase “principles of equity.” The 
adoption of a factor-based approach allows courts to retain the 
traditional flexibility and discretion they need when making equitable 
considerations. Such flexibility further secures the protection of 
plaintiffs by ensuring the availability of a broad array of remedies, 
including a profits award. In other words, this decision gives courts the 
flexibility to adequately protect plaintiffs in trademark infringement 
cases. Such flexibility is necessary to give an injured plaintiff the 
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opportunity to be adequately compensated for their losses as a result of 
a defendant’s infringing conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Much confusion has arisen as to whether, under § 1117(a), 
willfulness is a prerequisite to an award of an infringer’s profits for a 
violation of § 1125(a). Such confusion caused a split among the circuit 
courts regarding whether to adopt a bright-line rule requiring 
willfulness as a prerequisite to recovery of an infringing defendant’s 
profits, or whether to adopt a factor-based approach, whereby 
willfulness is one of several factors to consider. The Supreme Court 
resolved the split when it rejected a bright-line approach and instead 
adopted a factor-based approach. By adopting a factor-based approach, 
the Supreme Court has given broader protection to both trademark 
owners and the consuming public, has further deterred would-be 
defendants from infringing a plaintiff’s mark, and has allowed courts 
to retain the flexibility traditionally afforded to them when making 
equitable considerations. As a result of its decision, the Supreme Court 
has ensured that the broad goals of the Lanham Act, protecting mark 
owners and protecting the consuming public, have been served.  
